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Estate of GASTON J. BRUNET, Deceased. O. G. FREY.
ERMUTH et at., Appellants; v. JURY SPECKTEB,
Individually and as Administratrix, etc., et at., Respondents.
(1] WillI-LapliDg-8ubatlmUOlW'J PrcrriIiODl b:a WUl.-1D a
devise of realty to a lWDed nonrelative "or his Estate" the
quoted words are words, not of limit~tiOD deftniDg the estate
the devisee wu to neeive, but of dODatioD to designate the
recipient or recipients of the devise, and the testator's a8e
of the disjunctive "or"denotes an intention to substitute an
alternative taker in the event the devisee predeceased him.
[I] Id.-Lapsfq-SubstitutioD&17 ProvisiODl iDWi4.-The word
"another," as DIed in Prob. Code, f 92, deeIariDg that a testamentary gift to a devilee or legatee who dies during the
testator's lifetime faDs UDless an intention appears to "substitute another" in his plaee, neeessarily implies another devisee or legatee eapabJe of takiDg the property.
[8] Id.-Oonatruct1on-lDtention of Testator.-The objective in
the interpretation of a will is to ascertain the intentioD of
the testator u discloaed by the IaDguage he has DIed.
[1] Dtovise or bequest to ODe "or his heirs" as aftected by death
of pe1'80D named before death of testator, notes, 78 A.Ia.B. 992;
128 A.L.B. 94.
McK. Dia. &aferences: [1J Wills, 1343; [2] Wills, 1342;
[3] Wills, 1273; [4] Wills,§325.
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[4) Id.-Designiotion o~ -Takers-''Estate.''-The term ''Estate,''
as used in a will devising realty t.o a named person "or his
Estate," and drawn by a testator who was unfamiliar with
legal termillology. must be construed, in the light of the rule8
that, words of a will are to receive an interpretation which
will give them effect and avoid intestacy, to mean the devisee's hell'8 or devisees.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco decreeing distribution of
an estate. T. 1. Fitzpatrick, Judge. Affirmed.
Marion Vecki for Appellants.

W. S. Solari and Albert Picard for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J .-By a holographic will dated October I,
1941. the testator devised "To Otto Speckter or his Estate
The Property at Clear Lake & Improvements on same."
Speckter, who was not related to the testator, died on July 1,
1943. The testator died on May 14, 1945. In the course
of administration the property at Clear Lake was sold, and
the decree of distribution awarded the proceeds of the sale
"to the heirs or devisees of Otto Speckter, deceased, subject
to the administration of his estate." Appellants, executors
and legatees under the will, appeal from the decree of distribution.
The only question presented on this appeal is whether the
devise to "Otto Speckter or his Estate I I lapsed by reason
of Speckter's death before the death of the testator. If a
devisee who is not kindred of the testator dies during the
testator's lifetime, "the testamentary disposition to him fails,
unless an intention appears to substitute another in his place . .,
(Prob. Code, § 92.) The determination whether the devise
lapsed therefore depends upon whether the testator intendt'd
to substitute another for Speckter in the event he predeceased
the restator and, if the testator had such intention, whether
he substituted another in Speckter's place by designating
Speckter's "Estate" as the substitutional beneficiary.
[1] Relying upon Estate of Sessions, 171 Cal. 346 {I5S
P. 231], appellants contend that the phrase, "or his Estate,"
does not indicate an intention by the testator to substitute
an alternative taker in tht' event Speckter predeceased him.
In that case, the court held that a bequest to "William E.
Jackson [who predeceased the testator], and to his heirs and
c

•
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assigns forever" lapsed on the ground that the italicized
phrase was merely technical language customarily used to
pass the fee to property. (Slle, also, Estate of Barton, 196
Cal. 508, 515 [238 P. 681] ; Estate of Minor, 59 Cal.App. 616
[211 P. 807].) In the present ea..cre, however, the' words "or
his Estate," are words, not of limitation defining the estate
that Otto Speckter was to receive, but of donation to designate the recipient or recipients of the devise. The testator's
use of the disjunctive "or" clearly denotes an intention to
substitute an alternative taker in the event Speckter predeceased him. (See Estate of Coleman, 189 Cal. 612, 619 [209
P. 571] ; Estate of Minor, supra, 59 Cal.App. 616, 619; Atkinson on Wills, p. 728; 4 Page on Wills [Lifetime Ed.], p. 172.)
[2] The question remains, however, whether the testator's
designation of Speckter's estate constitutes the substitution
of another in the place of Speckter as required by section 92
of the Probate Code. The word •• another" as used in that
section necessarily implies another devisee or legatee capable
of taking the property. Appellants contend that the estate
of a named devisee is not another for the purpose of substitution, on the ground that an estate is not a natural person
or entity capable by law of taking under a will within the
meaning of section 27 of the Probate Code. Respondents eontend, however, that the word "Estate" was used by the testator to designate Speckter's heirs or devisees as the substitutional beneficiaries and that therefore natural persons have
been substituted in the place of Speckter to prevent the lapse
of the devise. This contention is challenged by appellants
on the ground that the meaning of the word" Estate" is too
indefinite to denote the recipients of the devise.
[3] The objective in the interpretation of 8 will is to
ascertain the intention of the testator as disclosed by the
language he has used. (Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337. 345
[55 P. 1011]; Estate of Henderson, 161 Cal. 353, 357 (119
P. 496] ; Estate of Ottoveggio, 64 Cal.App.2d 388, 391 [148
P.2d 878].) [4] In its technical sense, the term "estate"
signifies the "degree, quantity. nature and extent of interest
which 8 person has in real property." (Bouvier Law Dictionnry. See, also, Civ. Code, § 761 et seq.; Rest., Property,
§ 9.) Section 106 of the Probate Code provides that "technical 'Words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense,
unless the context cl<>arly indicates a contrary intention, or
unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely
by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such tech-
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nical sense." The will before us was drawn by the testator,
a layman, and it is evident from the context of the devise
that he did not use the term "Estate" in its technical sense.
(See Estate of Gracey, 200 Cal. 482. 491-492 t253 P. 921];
Estate 01 Peabody, 154 Cal. 173, 177 [97 P. 184]; Estate 01
Coleman, ~pra, 189 Cal. 612, 620; Estate of Tkramm, 80
Cal.App.2d 756, 762 [183 P.2d 97]; Estate of OlBen, 9 Cal.
App.2d 374, 379 [50 P.2d 70].) When the technical meaning
of the term is substituted for the term itself, there can be
no doubt that the testator was not referring to the interest
Otto Speckter was to have in the.property devised.
The question therefore arises, what did the testator mean
by "Estate" when he used that term in the devise! Appellants rely principally upon Estate 01 Glass, 164 Cal.
765 [130 P. 868], to support their contention that "Estate"
cannot be construed to mean Speckter's heirs or devisees.
In that ease the will contained the provision, ., The balance
to go to father Glass 'sestate. " Since Father Glass was alive
at the time of the execution of the will, the term "estate"
was used with reference to a living pe1'I9n. In recognition
of this fact this court stated: '.- The language of the testatrix thus being referred to the date of her will and not to
the date of her death, by the plain terms of the will Nellie
Glass attempted to leave. the residue of her estate, not to
Thomas Glass, but to Thomas Glass's estate. Thomas Glass's
estate ~ not a person or entity which can take under the will.
(Civ. Code, sees. 1275, 1313 [now, Prob. Code, §§ 27,41-43].)
When used with refer.ence to a living man 'estate' may either
mean all of his property and property interests, as colloquially, 'upon his death he will leave a large estate,' or it
may refer specifically to a particular property in land, as his
'estate in Sonoma County.' But however used as to a living
man no property can pass to it by descent, devise or bequest." (164 Cal. at p. 767.) In the present ease, however,
since the will provided that the property was to go to "Otto
Speekter or his Estate," the term was used with reference
to a deceased person. The testator's intention to provide for
two contingencies is clear: if Otto Speekter survived the testator, the property was to go to Speckter, but if Speckter
predeceased the testator the property was to go to Speckter's
estate. Thus the testator's will itself provides for the very
disposition of the property that the court in Estate 01 Glass
said it could Dot read into the words "to father Glass's
estate": "The construction contended for by appellants,-
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namely, that the will is to be read as though it declared that
the balance should go to Thomas Glass if alive, and if not,
then to his estate, by his estate meaning his legal heirs, or
his devisees or legatees as the ease may be, is too strained
to be permissible." (164 Cal. at p. 767.) By reason of the
use of the alternative in the will before us, "To Otto Speck.
ler or his Estate," that construction in this case is not strained
at all. It is the natural one.
Moreover, such a construction is compelled by the rule
that •• The words of a will are to receive an. interpreta·
tion which will give to every expression some effect, rather
than one which wil1 render any of the expressions inoperative
. . . " (Prob. Code, § 102), and by the rule that "Whenever a
disputed word or phrase may be reasonably given either of two
meanings, that meaning should be given which will prevent 10·
testacy . . . constructions which lead to either total or partial
intestacy are not favored." (Estate of OZsen, supra, 9 Cal.App.
2d 374, 379; Estate of Lawrence, 17 Ca1.2d 1, 7 [108 P.2d
893] ; Estate of Gracey, supra, 200 Cal. 482, 492; Estate of
O'Gorman, 161 Cal. 654, 658 [120 P. 33J. See, also, Prob.
Code, § 102.) The application of these rules to the devise
in question leads to the conclusion that the testator meant
that if Speckter predeceased him, the property was to go
to the persons entitled to succeed to Speckter's estate, namely
his heirs or devisees. This construction is not only a reason·
abl~ and natural one, but is supported by decisions of courts
of other jurisdictions. (Leary v. Liberty Trust Co., 272
Mass. 1, 5 [171 N.E. 828, 69 A.L.R. 1239]; Clark v. Payne,
288 Ky. 819 [157 S.W.2d 63] ; Reid v Neal, 182 N.C. 192 [108
S.E. 769J; Bottomley v. Bottomley, 134 N.J.Eq. 279, 287
[35A.2d 475] ; Rogers v. Walton, 141 Me. 91 [39 A.2d 409] ;
Arnett v. Fairmont Trust Co., 70 W.Va. 296 [73S.E. 930];
In re Billman's Estate, 175 Misc. 334 [24 N.Y.S.2d 43,4748].
Contra: Gardner v. Anderson, 114 Kan. 778 [227 P. 743]
[affirmed on rehearing, 116 Kan. 431 (227 P. 743)] ; Martin
v. Hale, 167 Tenn. 438 (71 S.W.2d 2111; Downing v. Grigsby,
251 Ill. 568 [96 N.E. 513]. See. also, Rest., Property, § 314,
comment a, wherein it is stated: "Where a person makes a
gift in remainder t.o his own heirs . . . the] intends the
same thing as if he had given the remainder 'to my estate.' "
Accord: Bixby v. California Trust Co., 33 Cal.2d 495, 498
[202 P.2d 1018].)
In Reid v. Neal, supra, 182 N.C. 192, the will provided:
"I lend to my daughter, Laura Reid, 59lf2 acres, the remainder

)
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of my land . . . to her during her natural life, and at her
death 1 give it to her bodily heirs, if any, and if none to return to my estate." It was there contended that the devise
over was void on the ground that the term "estate" did not
refer to persons, but to the condition or circumstances in
which the testator stood with reference to his property, and
for the further reason that there was confusing uncertainty
as to the persons who might succeed to the property upon
failure of bodily heirs. In boldingthat the phrase "to return
to my estate" should be construed to mean that the property
was to go to the testator's heirs or next of kin upon failure
of bodily heirs and that therefore the devise over was valid,
the court stated: "In construing this clause-'lf any, and
if none, to return to my estate'-the intent of the testator
must be sought unless we hold as a matter of law that the
clause is void upon its face. If the words referred to are
susceptible of any construction which is consistent with the
validity of the will in its entirety, we cannot declare them
void. . . . It cannot be successfully urged that the word
4 estate' makes the last limitation void for uncertainty. This
word has more than one meaning, and is susceptible of more
than one construction. Anciently confined to land, it has
been enlarged so as to embrace property of every description.
Enumerated with words which are descriptive of personal or
chattel interests, it may exclude real estate altogether. It may
denote the quantity of interest, or the thing devised, or the
condition or circumstances in which the owner stands in
regard to his property. [Citation omitted.) Also, it has been
construed as meaning a person. Bennett v. 8tate [62 Ark.
516], 36 S.W.R. 948. Its legal signification must be ascertained from the context, or an examination of all the provisions of the instrument in which it appears." (182 N.C. at
198-199.)
As in Reid v. Neal, supra, we cannot hold as a matter of
law that the devise to Speckter'. HEstate" is void on its
face, since the word •• estate" is sUliCeptible of more than
one construction according to its context. It is clear from
the context of the devise that the term "estate" was not used
in its technical sense to describe Speckter's interest in the
property devised, and was not used to refer to any particular
property Speckter might have or to the aggregate of property he might leave upon his death. It is more reasonable
to conclude, in the light of the rulcs that the provisions of
a will must be construed to give them effect and to avoid intes-
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tacy, that the testator, a layman, in using the term "estate"
with reference to a deceased person and to describe the alter·
native takers of the devise, intended that Speckter's heirs or
devisees should take the devise in the event that Speckter
died in the testator's lifetime.
The decree is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spenee, J., eoneurred.
CARTER, J .-1 concur in the result but believe that Estate
of Glass, 164 Cal. 765 [130 P. 868], is inconsistent therewith
and should be overruled. The essence of the holding in that
ease is that a devise to a named person's estate is not proper
because the word "estate" cannot be construed to mean "heirs
or devisees." In the case at bar the majority determines, and
I believe properly so, that the word "estate" should and
must be interpreted to mean" heirs or devisees."
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment solely on the
ground that upon the record the trial court was warranted in
finding as a fact that the testator in using the language, •• To
Otto Speckter or his Estate," intended to make an alternative
devise-a devise to Mr. Speckter if he survived the testator
but in the event of his demise prior to the death of the testator, then to the heirs at law of Speckter.
SHENK, J., Dissenting. - 1 agree with the majority
opinion of the District Court of Appeal of the First Appellate District, Division Two (Estate of Brunet (Cal.App.)
[200 P.2d 591) in holding that "an estate is not a person or entity which can take under a will" as contemplated
by the provisions of section 92 of the Probate Code and the
decisions in this state construing that section. The majority
opinion cannot be reconciled with the holding in the Estate
of Glass, 164 Cal. 765 [130 P. 868]. I would therefore reverse the judgment.
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